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tive bargaining System which imply that collective bargaining is not functioning as it should and is therefore adding to the difficulties associated with managing the économie System. 1 However, the alternative, and in my view, the correct line of causation is that the current state of the économie system is the underlying factor in creating disruptions in the collective bargaining system. Specifically, unanticipated inflation in the 1970's, combined with 2 and 3 year collective agreements, has led to a situation of rather large wage settlements to offset past and expected future inflation and thèse settlements hâve been associated with an increasing frequency of strike activity. The purpose of this paper is to investigate empirically the impact of inflation on the level of strike activity in Canada. 2 As an introduction to the model of strike activity to be tested in this paper, it may be useful to compare what I regard as the two major approaches to strike causation. Thèse two approaches may be described as the "social-political" view and the "économie" view. The social-political view tends to focus on the concept of militancy 3 and attempts to explain why trade union leaders and their membership appear to be more militant at some times than at others. Although it is not possible to totally dichotomize the two approaches, those whose focus is on militancy accept that économie forces will hâve an impact but that the entire story is "much more complex». 4 The économie view, on the other hand, is characterized by a belief that it is not principally the militancy of the parties in the collective bargaining system that leads to cycles of strike activity but rather that it is fluctuations in the économie environment facing the collective bargaining system. The différence can be formally stated in terms of the concept of an industrial relations system. 5 Such a system is logically divided into 1 For example, Ronald Anderson in The Globe and Mail, May 27, 1975 , page B2 puts it as follows: "Evidence of the unhealthy condition of the collective bargaining system is provided by the increasing number of work stoppages, the fréquent refusai of union members to ratify agreements reached by their bargaining teams and the inability of management and labour to settle their différences on a non-inflationary basis. » 2 For a discussion of many of thèse gênerai issues, without formai statistical tests, see L.A. KELLY and P. KUMAR, Inflation and Collective Bargaining, Research and Current Issues Séries No. 24, Industrial Relations Centre, Queen's University, Kingston, October, 1974, pp. 1-20. 3 As an example of the militancy approach, which dénies the inclusiveness of an économie explanation, see J.H.G. CRISPO and H.W. ARTHURS «Industrial Unrest in Canada: A Diagnosis of Récent Expérience» Relations Industrielles /Industrial Relations, v. 23, no. 2, June, 1968, pp. 237-264. 4 CRISPO and ARTHURS, op. cit., p. 238. four segments. They are: the environment, the actors, the conversion mechanism and the outputs. More compactly, the industrial relations System converts inputs into outputs. A collective agreement is an output as is a strike. Logically, the industrial relations system can begin to prgduce a greater proportion of strike outputs and consequently a smaller proportion of agreement outputs for two reasons. There can be either changes in the environment or changes in the actors. In this paper, the économie System is looked at as a crucial environmental factor whereas militancy refers to changes in the values and goals of the actors. The contention of this paper is that fluctuations in the level of strike activity, and particularly the récent increase, can be explained adequately by économie factors without resort to the much more nebulous and less quantifiable concept of militancy. 6 The next step is to specify the model of strike détermination that would adequately represent the économie view. 7 The primary concern of this paper is with the effect of inflation on the level of strike activity. Unanticipated inflation which occurs in fixed term collective agreements and which varies over time increases uncertainty, tends to decrease the term of collective agreements and generally makes it more difficult to reach agreement without a work stoppage. The inflation rate and the level of strike activity are, therefore, expected to be positively related. Also, the rate of unemployment is expected to hâve an effect on the level of strike activity since at lower unemployment rates, striking union members hâve more atternative employment opportunités, thereby reducing the cost and increasing the probability of a strike. In addition, the rate of change of unemployment is regarded as an important variable : at a given level of unemployment, strike effects will differ depending on whether the rate is rising or falling. For instance, in the context of a rising unemployment rate, union «catchup» wage demands may be based on market conditions of the récent past whereas the employer uses the rate of change of the unemployment rate to forecast the state of the market over the future life of the proposed contract. Such a change would increase the gap between union demand and employer offer, increasing the probability of a strike. On the basis of thèse hypothèses that économie factors are of crucial importance, we get the foliowing équation to explain strike activity. 6 A sélection from the Crispo and Arthurs causes of militancy includes: « The Pervasiveness of the Demand for More in Our Affluent Society -Job Insecurity -The Influx of Young People & Lack of Satisfaction of Higher Order Needs -Rising Educational Levels» pp. 247-255. In my view, such concepts are inadéquate to explain changes in the level of strike activity. They may explain why Canada has more strikes than some other countries but not why this level fluctuâtes. The «Demand for More» certainly exists in any society but it existed just as much in 1964 when there were 327 strikes as it did in 1974 when there were over one thousand strikes. 7 For a more detailed outline of the model of strike activity, see Douglas A. SMITH, «The Déterminants of Strike Activity in Canada», Relations Industrielles! Industrial Relations, v. 27, no. 4, Dec. 1972, pp. 663-678. St = fio + fi\ Ut + fîi pt + fi3 A Ut + et where St is the number of strikes 8 at time t; Ut is the unemployment rate at time t; pt is the rate of change of the Consumer Price Index at time t; AUt = Ut -Ut î. The hypothesized signs are fi i < 0,fii > O and^:$ > O.
The empirical results of three tests of this hypothesis are presented in Table 1 . This table présents the results of three régressions. The first régression uses quarterly strike data for ail industries in Canada 9 , the second équation uses annual data for ail industries and the third présents results for the food and beverage industry, a 2-digit manufacturing industry. This last équation is included as a preliminary report on the initial stage of an attempt to explain strike activity on a more disaggregated basis than is usually investigated. This is important if empirical work on strike activity is to be of any real usefulness ; clearly a strike équation that works reasonably well in the aggregate but poorly for individual industries is of limited usefulness.
The results provide rather strong support for a hypothesis that stresses the importance of the économie déterminants of strike activity. The coefficient on the inflation variable 10 is particularly strong with the coefficient being several times its standard error. The coefficient of the unemployment variable always has the correct sign and passes the usual test of statistical significance in the quarterly results for ail industries. The unemployment change variable again always has the correct sign but really perforais adequately only in the quarterly régression. The quarterly results indicate that, in terms of the coefficients on Bi and B2, every additional percentage point of inflation leads to an extra 15 strikes per quarter while an additional percentage point in the unemployment rate will restrain the level of strike activity by approximately 8 strikes per quarter. In terms of overall explanatory power, the annual équation works extremely well for the food and beverage industry with the inflation rate again having a large and statistically significant effect. For this industry, Table 1 indicates that every additional percentage point of inflation leads to an additional 7 strikes per year, a relatively large amount when one considers that the mean over the period of estimation is 34 strikes. The results of this section indicate that strike activity is very closely related to basic économie variables and that the current level of strike activity is not unusual by historical standards -it is in fact quite predictable on the 8 Strike data are as reported in Strikes and Lockouts in Canada, published by the Department of Labour, the C.P.I. is from Statistics Canada Priées and Price Indices, cat. no. 62-002 and the unemployment rate is from Statistics Canada, The Labour Force, cat. no. 71-001. 9 This régression uses seasonal dummy variables Dl, D2 and D3 which take the value of 1 in that quarter and 0 otherwise. 10 The précise version of the inflation hypothesis would stress the importance of unanticipated inflation in creating industrial conflict. The actual inflation rate would cease to be a useful proxy for this in the context of an extended period of fully anticipated inflation. basis of the équations presented in Table 1 . The most important single factor in explaining this level of strike activity is the impact of the rate of inflation.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper has examined the impact of inflation on collective bargaining through a séries of empirical tests of the relationship between strike activity and the rate of inflation. Thèse empirical tests provide strong support for the hypothesis that économie variables are of primary importance in explaining the time path of industrial disputes and by implication that many of the studies which attempt to relate strike activity to variations in militancy are introducing a not particularly quantifiable variable which does not appear to be a necessary part of the explanation of strike activity. In one sensé, strike activity and militancy appear virtually synonymous but it is the point of this paper that the underlying mechanism is based on fluctuations in the économie System determining the nature of the outputs in the collective bargaining system. Thèse results hâve implications for theoretical and empirical studies of the process of wage détermination and for public policy to control strike activity in Canada. This paper expresses serious réservations about the usefulness the concept of militancy as a déterminant of strike activity. Many current theoretical and empirical studies of wage détermination also refer to militancy as a variable explaining the rate of change of wages and I feel the same objections that are made in the context of strikes also pertain. n In this paper, it is argued that militancy is not a necessary aspect of the analysis of fluctuations in strike activity. In fact, if militancy is an important aspect of wage détermination and strike activity, then we are really left without an explanation of either. If the militancy view is accepted, we hâve cycles of strike activity and fluctuations in the rate of change of wages because trade unions are more militant at some times than at others. This is not impossible but it does not appear to be consistent with utility maximization by labour force participants. If militancy pays, why are workers not always militant? Militancy as a déterminant of wage and strike outputs of the industrial relations system makes those outputs exogenous. I2 It caneot say anything about what leads to fluctuations in thèse magnitudes and has as the only logical policy response direct control of militant groups.
This makes the policy implications of the view that stresses économie factors, rather than militancy, quite clear. The current level of strike activity in the labour market does not represent a departure from the relationship of the late 1950's and the early 1960's. The outputs are quantitatively différent because the nature of the inputs from the économie system has changed. Collective bargaining is a process which requires a délicate balance between bargaining toughness and acceptance of necessary compromises. The system does not work perfeetîy when faced with a relatively tranquil économie environment but in the face of significant économie fluctuations which increase greatly the uncertainties of negotiations, it is naive not to expect an upturn in strike activity. Theory and évidence strongly suggest that the flow of causation hère is from the économie system to the industrial relations system and that the current level of strike activity will diminish only with improved performance of the économie System. This has the clear policy implication that the most effective method of reducing strike activity is through économie policy to reduce fluctuations in the rate of inflation rather than through legislated changes in the industrial relations System which would deal only with the symptoms and not the causes of récent strike activity.
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Over a period of 16 years , approximately 4,500 strikes took place in Canada; less than 30 or .7 percent of thèse were regarded as emergency disputes. l Government intervention in thèse cases symbolizes concern for protecting public interest and maintenance of an equilibrium in the exercise of économie freedom by various groups in the society. Government's non-intervention in the remaining 99.3 percent cases is a reflection of the Canadian public policy concerning labour disputes. Free collective bargaining is the corner-stone of labour législation and practice in this country, indicating governmental commitment, in a légal and économie sensé, to upholding the right of the labour unions to strike. It is logical corollary of a pluralistic market system where décisions concerning wages are made through an independent collective bargaining relationship between management and organized labour : management defending the économie principle of free enterprise and labour defending the political principles of «freedom of association» and its extension, freedom to strike.
The strikes in our industrial relations System hâve a positive function and appear to be in the public interest. 2 The resolution of conflict through this mechanism préserves the fundamental démocratie 
